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IN RE JOHN C.-AN OPPORTUNITY FOR
THE NEW YORK COURTS TO SAVE
MIRANDA FROM THE PUBLIC SAFETY
EXCEPTION
The Constitution of the United States affords an individual a
number of guarantees against the processes of the criminal justice
system.1 One such safeguard is the right against self-incrimina-
tion.2 In the seminal case of Miranda v. Arizona,' the United
' See US. CONsT. amends. IV, V, VI, VIII & XIV. These amendments place certain
limitations on governmental power in order to protect individual rights and liberties. See T.
MARKS JR. & J. REILLY, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1979). Originally, the fourth,
fifth, sixth, and eighth amendments only placed limitations on the power of the the federal
government. 1 J. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED 2 (2d ed. 1985). Today,
however, most of the protections afforded by these amendments have been applied to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See 2 R. ROTUNDA, J.
NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 14.2, at
2-7 (1986 & Supp. 1987).
The fourth amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures,
and provides that no warrants shall be issued except upon a showing of probable cause. U.S.
CONST. amend. IV. See generally 1-3 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT (1978 & Supp. 1986).
Among the protections provided by the fifth amendment are the requirement of indict-
ment by a grand jury in cases involving infamous crimes, the prohibition against double
jeopardy, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the guarantee that no person shall "be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The sixth amendment guarantees a defendant in criminal cases the right to a speedy
and public trial by an impartial jury, the right to confront opposing witnesses, the right to
be informed of the accusations against him, and the right to have the assistance of counsel.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
The eighth amendment protects those convicted of crimes from being subjected to cruel
and unusual punishment and prohibits the setting of excessive bail. U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII.
For a thorough discussion of the guarantees afforded by these amendments, see 1-3 J.
COOK, supra.
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person shall...
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.. . . Id. This guarantee
was made binding upon the states through the fourteenth amendment in Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964).
The privilege against self-incrimination was developed to combat the inquisitorial
methods of interrogation that were used in England in the early seventeenth century. See
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596-97 (1896). "So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient
system impress themselves upon the minds of the American colonists that the States, with
one accord, made a denial of the right to question an accused person a part of their funda-
mental law.. . ." Id. at 597. See also L. LEvy, ORIms OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (1968)
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States Supreme Court held that a criminal suspect had to be ad-
vised of this right prior to custodial interrogation,4 otherwise, any
incriminating responses made during questioning would not be al-
lowed into evidence at trial.' However, in New York v. Quarles,'
the Court subsequently carved out an exception to this rule,
whereby statements made by a suspect during custodial interroga-
tion would be admissible at trial, despite the absence of Miranda
(well-documented discussion of genesis of fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrim-
ination).
The fifth amendment's guarantee against being compelled to incriminate oneself re-
flects many of society's fundamental values. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S.
52, 55 (1964) (describing policies embodied in privilege against self-incrimination). It makes
manifest "our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal
justice," and "our realization that the privilege, while sometimes 'a shelter to the guilty,' is
often 'a protection to the innocent.'" Id. (citation omitted).
- 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Miranda decision involved four separate cases which were
consolidated on appeal. See id. at 491-99. In each case, the defendant had been arrested,
taken to a police station, and interrogated without fully being informed of his constitutional
rights. See id. During the course of each of the interrogations, the police secured a confes-
sion from the defendant that was used at trial to obtain a conviction. Id. at 445.
' See id. at 444. The Miranda Court defined "custodial interrogation" as "questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. (footnote omitted). The Su-
preme Court has subsequently clarified the meaning of "custody" by stating that "the ulti-
mate inquiry is simply whether there is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of move-
ment' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121,
1125 (1983) (quoting Oregon v Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)). The Court has also
expanded the meaning of "interrogation" to encompass not only "express questioning, but
also to [include] any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally
attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response from the suspect." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)
(footnotes omitted).
I Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Specifically, the Court held that:
without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons sus-
pected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to
undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he
would not otherwise do so freely. In order to combat these pressures and to permit
a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused
must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those
rights must be fully honored.
Id. at 467. Consequently, the Court concluded that all statements made by the accused
during custodial interrogation should be inadmissible under the fifth amendment unless the
accused is:
warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that any-
thing he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to
the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Id. at 479.
6 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
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warnings, when the questioning of the suspect could have been rea-
sonably prompted by a concern for the public safety.7 Recently, in
In re John C.," the Appellate Division, Second Department, deter-
mined that the public safety exception was not applicable, despite
the presence of conditions apparently sufficient to raise it.'
In re John C. involved the questioning of an eleven-year-old
boy by police officers concerning the location of a gun used in the
shooting of another youth.10 At no time during the questioning was
the juvenile advised of his Miranda rights." During the course of
his interrogation he made several incriminating statements. 2 At
his juvenile delinquency proceeding in family court, the youth
moved to have these statements suppressed, claiming a violation of
his right against self-incrimination. 13 The Family Court, Queens
County, partially denied the motion to suppress, holding that a
number of the statements were admissible under the Quarles pub-
lic safety exception. 14
In reversing the family court, the Appellate Division, Second
Department, distinguished the case from Quarles.5 The court, re-
lying on the length of the interrogation and the number of police
officers present, found that there was lacking the same type of vol-
Id. at 656. The Court held that "overriding considerations of public safety [could]
justify [an] officer's failure to provide Miranda warnings" preceding custodial interrogation
of the suspect. Id. at 651.
8 130 App. Div. 2d 246, 519 N.Y.S.2d 223 (2d Dep't 1987).
9 Id. at 247, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 224.
10 Id. For a discussion of some of the problems dealing with a juvenile's capacity to
waive his Miranda rights, see Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An
Empirical Analysis, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 1134 (1980).
"1 In re John C., 130 App. Div. 2d at 247-48, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 224-25.
12 Id. The youth was confronted by police officers in the apartment where the shooting
had taken place after the complainant told the officers that the youth had shot him. Id. The
juvenile was then asked: "Why did you shoot him and where is the gun?" Id. at 248, 519
N.Y.S.2d at 224. He responded, "I took the cartridge out. I didn't know the gun was loaded.
I didn't mean to shoot my friend. I don't have it." Id. The youth was subsequently placed
under arrest and taken to another room in the apartment where he was further questioned
concerning the location of the gun and eventually told the officers that he had given it to a
friend. Id. at 248, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 224-25.
13 Id. at 247, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 224. The most commonly used procedural device to vindi-
cate a violation of a person's constitutional rights is the motion to suppress evidence. R.
McNAMARA, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 231 (1982). For a discus-
sion of the origin and development of the exclusionary rule, see id. at 231-33.
14 In re John C., 130 App. Div. 2d at 249, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 225. The family court ex-
cluded all of the statements made by the youth except those made in response to the ques-
tions concerning the location of the gun. Id.
" Id. at 253-54, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 228-29.
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atile situation that was present in Quarles.6 The court also noted
that the officer who interrogated the youth did not appear to ques-
tion him out of any concern for the public safety.1"
However, when Quarles is closely examined, the factual dis-
tinctions cited by the appellate division in distinguishing In re
John C. appear illusory. It is submitted that the appellate division
should have employed an alternative approach in holding the pub-
lic safety exception inapplicable. This Comment will analyze the
shortcomings of the public safety exception and suggest that the
New York courts rely to a greater degree on the provisions of the
New York State Constitution in determining the extent of a per-
son's right against self-incrimination. Such an approach would al-
low the New York courts to ensure that the constitutional safe-
guards enunciated in Miranda are preserved.
SELF-INCRIMINATION PRIOR TO Quarles
Prior to Miranda, the fifth amendment right against self-in-
crimination was considered only applicable to courtroom proceed-
ings, whereas police interrogations were generally scrutinized
under the fourteenth amendment."" In determining whether a sus-
pect's rights had been violated under the fourteenth amendment,
the courts generally employed a due process "voluntariness" test.'9
"8 Id. at 254, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 228. See infra text accompanying notes 28-34 (discussing
facts of Quarles).
17 Id.
18 See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 279, 285 (1936) (reliance upon due pro-
cess clause of fourteenth amendment rather than fifth amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination in holding confession inadmissible). But see Brain v. United States, 168 U.S.
532 (1897). In Brain, the Supreme Court spoke broadly of the application of the fifth
amendment to involuntary statements. Id. at 542. The Court stated that "[iun criminal trials
... wherever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary,
the issue is controlled by that portion of the fifth amendment .. . commanding that no
person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.'" Id. Brain
appeared to adopt the view that if a confession was coerced by someone in authority, it
would be inadmissible under the fifth amendment irrespective of whether the coercion took
place in a courtroom proceeding. See id. In subsequent cases involving the admissibility of
confessions, the Supreme Court ignored the Brain decision, and instead applied the due
process "voluntariness" test. See Dix, Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit, and the
Modern Law of Confessions, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 275, 289. The Court, however, vigorously
upheld the Bram decision in Miranda stating that Brain "set down the Fifth Amendment
standard for compulsion which we implement today." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461
(1966). For a further discussion of the constitutional significance of Brain, see Kamisar,
Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Civil Procedure, in CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 47 (Howard ed. 1965).
'9 See, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961) (dispositve question is
[Vol. 62:143
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A two-part analysis was developed which utilized a subjective test
to ascertain if the incriminating response was essentially the result
of free choice,20 and an objective test to determine if the circum-
stances surrounding such response were inherently coercive.21
A major shortcoming of this test was the absence of any clear
guidelines for determining the admissibility of incriminating state-
ments made by a suspect during custodial interrogation. 22 Conse-
quently, decisions were very often inconsistent.2 3 The undesirabil-
ity of ad hoc analyses ultimately led to the Supreme Court's
pronouncement in Miranda that all statements made by a suspect
during custodial interrogation would be conclusively presumed
whether actions of law enforcement officials were such as to overbear suspect's will to resist
and bring about confessions not freely self-determined). In Rogers, the Court stated that
involuntary confessions are inadmissible:
not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because the methods used
to extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal
law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system-a system in
which the State must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured
and may not by coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his own
mouth.
Id. at 540-41 (citations omitted).
20 See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961) (individual's mental state
and powers of resistance considered in determining whether confession voluntary).
"Whether or not particular police conduct amounts to coercion depends upon the individ-
ual characteristics of the suspect interrogated .... What constitutes coercion for one ac-
cused will not do so for another because it takes greater pressure to overbear the 'power of
resistance' of one individual than another." Comment, The Coerced Confession Cases in
Search of a Rationale, 31 U. CHL L. R.v. 313, 318-19 (1964) (emphasis added).
21 See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 153-54 (1944) (situation so inherently
coercive that confession deemed involuntary irrespective of actual effect on suspect). See
also White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 581 (1979) (courts
focus on means used to obtain confession). "[Clertain coercive interrogation techniques re-
sult in an 'involuntary' confession as a matter of law... irrespective of their effect on the
actual defendant before the court." Id. at 583-84 (emphasis added).
22 See Bator & Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and the Right to Counsel:
Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 62, 72 (1966) ("Judi-
cial decisions speak in terms of the 'voluntariness' of a confession, but the term itself pro-
vides little guidance."). The Miranda Court recognized this problem when it stated that one
of its goals was "to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and
courts to follow" when considering the admissibility of custodial interrogations. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1966).
22 Compare Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 230-41 (1941) (confession obtained af-
ter prolonged interrogation during which police officer struck suspect held admissible) with
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 284-86 (1936) (confessions obtained after suspects were
whipped held inadmissible). But see Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1417
(1985). One critic of Miranda feels that such prior inconsistent decisions were "less a by-
product of the voluntariness standard than a reflection of the deep cleavages in society that
were at last becoming apparent." Id. at 1434.
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compelled, and thus inadmissible, unless the suspect had been in-
formed of his constitutional rights before the statement was
made.24
In the years following the Miranda decision, the Supreme
Court has pursued a course of exception-making 5 which has led to
speculation that Miranda will be abandoned entirely in the near
future.26 It appears that one of the severest blows to Miranda has
come from the Court's decision in New York v. Quarles.
THE Quarles PUBLIC SAFETY ExcEPTION
In Quarles, a police officer entered a supermarket shortly after
midnight pursuant to information supplied by a rape victim that
her assailant had entered the store and was armed.28 Upon seeing
the police officer, the suspect fled toward the rear of the store.29
After regaining sight of the suspect, the officer ordered him to stop
and he complied.30 An empty shoulder holster was discovered dur-
ing the ensuing frisk.3 ' While surrounded by a number of police
officers, the suspect was handcuffed and asked the location of the
21 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. See also Gardner, The Emerging Good Faith Excep-
tion to the Miranda Rule-A Critique, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 429, 447-48 (1984) (custodial inter-
rogation governed by Miranda requirements). Another commentator has observed that:
[g]iven the Court's inability to articulate a clear and predictable definition of "vol-
untariness," the apparent persistence of state courts in utilizing the ambiguity of
the concept to validate confessions of doubtful constitutionality, and the resultant
burden on its own workload, it seemed inevitable that the Court would seek "some
automatic device by which the potential evils of incommunicado interrogation
[could] be controlled."
Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 99, 102-03 (quoting S.
SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 10 (1967)). For a discussion of the Miranda holding,
see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444-48 (1974) (officer's "good faith" fail-
ure to give Miranda warnings did not require suppression of confession); Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (failure to give Miranda warnings did not preclude use of
defendant's statements to impeach his credibility at trial).
21 See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1970 Term-Admissibility of Unlawfully Obtained
Statement for Impeachment Purposes, 85 HARv. L. REV. 3, 53 (1971) ("willingness of the
[Burger] Court ... to retreat from Miranda suggests that... the Court will abandon Mi-
randa altogether").
27 See 467 U.S. 649 (1984). See also Comment, "Public-Safety" Exception to Miranda:
The Supreme Court Writes Away Rights, 61 CHI.[-]KENT L. REv. 577, 592 (1985) (the excep-
tion constitutes a "serious erosion" of Miranda).
28 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 651-52.





missing gun.32 He indicated that it was near some empty boxes.33
After the gun was recovered, the suspect was formally placed
under arrest, and then advised of his Miranda rights. 4
The New York Court of Appeals held that both the gun and
the defendant's statement indicating its location were inadmissible
because the suspect had not been informed of his Miranda rights
prior to making the incriminating responses.3 5 On appeal, the
United States Supreme Court reversed and created the public
safety exception to Miranda.6 The Quarles Court used a cost-ben-
efit analysis to demonstrate why Miranda warnings should not be
required when there is a danger to the public safety.3 7 The Court
reasoned that the Miranda majority had been willing to exclude
evidence and accept the possibility of fewer convictions of guilty
suspects in order to insure full protection of a person's fifth
amendment rights.38 The Court then posited that when the failure
to elicit evidence from a suspect results not only in fewer convic-
tions of guilty suspects, but also in a danger to the public safety,
such a cost would outweigh the benefits provided by Miranda
warnings.39 Consequently, the Court concluded that evidence ob-
tained without Miranda warnings, under such circumstances,
should not be suppressed.40
The Quarles Court explicitly refused to make the public safety
exception dependent upon the subjective intent of the interrogat-
ing officer.4 ' Instead, the Court adopted an objective test in which
52 Id.
,3 Id. The suspect nodded in the direction of the boxes and responded, "'the gun is
over there.'" Id.
4 Id.
31 People v. Quarles, 58 N.Y.2d 664, 444 N.E.2d 984, 458 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1982), rev'd,
467 U.S. 649 (1984). The New York Court of Appeals expressly found that "there [was] no
evidence in the record ... that there were exigent circumstances posing a risk to the public
safety .... ." Id. at 666, 444 N.E.2d at 985, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
" New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984).
3 Id. at 657.
3' Id. at 656-57.
11 Id. at 657. The Quarles Court stated that "the need for answers to questions in a
situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule
protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination." Id.
'0 Id. at 659-60.
"1 Id. at 656. The Court stated:
In a kaleidoscopic situation such as the one confronting these officers, where spon-
taneity rather than adherence to a police manual is necessarily the order of the
day, the application of the exception which we recognize today should not be
made to depend on post hoc findings at a suppression hearing concerning the sub-
jective motivation of the arresting officer.
1987]
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the exception could be invoked even if the officer's main motive for
questioning the suspect was to obtain incriminating evidence, so
long as the question could have been reasonably asked out of a
concern for the public safety.42
Through its creation of the public safety exception, the Su-
preme Court has diminished the desirable clarity of Miranda.43
The Court has failed to establish clear guidelines for trial courts to
utilize in determining the applicability of the public safety excep-
tion.44 Presumably, a court would conduct an inquiry into all of the
surrounding circumstances of the case in order to ascertain
whether the safeguards provided by Miranda warnings were out-
weighed by a danger to the public safety.45 Such an approach gives
rise to a certain amount of arbitrariness in its application, and
thus, is likely to lead to inconsistent decisions.46 These shortcom-
Id.
d42 Id. The Court noted, by way of analogy, that the subjective intent of the officer was
not dispositive with regard to other constitutional provisions such as the fourth amendment.
Id. at 656 n.6.
11 In the past, the clarity of Miranda had allowed courts to know with a fair degree of
certainty when statements obtained during custodial interrogation were to be admitted into
evidence. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979). In his dissenting opinion in
Quarles, Justice Marshall stated that the "public safety exception destroys forever the clar-
ity of Miranda for both law enforcement officers and members of the judiciary." New York
v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 679 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor echoed Jus-
tice Marshall's characterization of the public safety exception, stating that "[tihe end result
will be a finespun new doctrine on public safety exigencies incident to custodial interroga-
tion, complete with the hair-splitting distinctions that currently plague our Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence." Quarles, 467 U.S. at 663-64 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
" See Casenote, Miranda Warning Public Safety Exception: New York v. Quarles, 10
S. ILL. U.L.J. 735, 743 (1985); Note, New York v. Quarles: The Dissolution of Miranda, 30
VILL. L. REv. 441, 457 (1985). The Quarles majority also seemed to concede this when it
stated: "[iln recognizing a narrow exception to the Miranda rule in this case, we acknowl-
edge that to some degree we lessen the desirable clarity of that rule." Quarles, 467 U.S. at
658. However, the majority nevertheless believed that the exception could be easily applied
by police, stating that police would be able to distinguish "almost instinctively" between
questions necessary to secure the pulic safety and those aimed solely at eliciting incriminat-
ing evidence. Id. at 658-59.
"' For a discussion of this "balancing" approach, see text accompanying supra notes 37-
40.
46 The Quarles case itself is illustrative of the arbitrariness inherent in the public safety
exception. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 679 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Upon an examination of
the facts of Quarles, the New York Court of Appeals found no "exigent circumstances pos-
ing a risk to the public safety." People v. Quarles, 58 N.Y.2d 664, 666, 444 N.E.2d 984, 986,
458 N.Y.S.2d 520, 522 (1982), rev'd, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). The facts of the case appear to
support this finding; however, the Supreme Court on its review of the case, reached pre-
cisely the opposite conclusion, holding that the gun "obviously posed more than one danger
to the public safety .... ." New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984). As Justise Mar-
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ings were the primary reason why the Miranda Court abrogated
the due process "voluntariness" test and held that all statements
made by an accused during custodial interrogation would be con-
clusively presumed compelled in the absence of Miranda warn-
ings.47 Consequently, the public safety exception, in essence, con-
stitutes an undesirable regression to a pre-Miranda period.4 8
Moreover, in creating the public safety exception, the Court ap-
pears to have misconstrued Miranda. Miranda did not prohibit
the police from questioning a suspect in the absence of pre-interro-
gation warnings, it only required that any statements elicited as
the result of such questioning not be used against the accused at
trial.49
shall pointed out: "[i]f after plenary review two appellate courts so fundamentally differ
over the threat to public safety presented by the simple and uncontested facts of this case,
one must seriously question how law enforcement officers [and trial courts] will respond to
the majority's new rule .... Id. at 679 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Compare In re John C., 130 App. Div. 2d 246, 519 N.Y.S.2d 223 (2d Dep't 1987) (hold-
ing that passage of time among reasons why public safety exception inapplicable) with State
v. Hoyer, 30 Ohio App. 3d 130, 506 N.E.2d 1190 (1986) (suspect's responses concerning loca-
tion of gun given after transportion to police facilities admissible under public safety
exception).
47 See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 683 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted that
under the pre-Miranda "voluntariness" test it was very difficult for courts to determine
whether a given confession had been coerced. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). "Difficulties of
proof and subtleties of interrogation technique made it impossible in most cases for the
judiciary to decide with confidence whether the defendant had voluntarily confessed ....
Courts around the country were spending countless hours reviewing the facts of individual
custodial interrogations." Id. at 683 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Miranda Court elimi-
nated these practical problems by holding that statements made during custodial interroga-
tion, in the absence of prior warnings, would be presumed compelled in violation of the fifth
amendment. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
48 See Comment, The Public Safety Exception to Miranda v. Arizona-New York v.
Quarles, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 169, 189 (1985). For a discussion of some of the shortcom-
ings associated with the pre-Miranda "voluntariness" test, see supra notes 22-24 and ac-
companying text.
" See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 664 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
Justice O'Connor explained this flaw in the Quarles majority's analysis:
The justification the Court provides for upsetting the equilibrium that has
finally been achieved-that police cannot and should not balance considerations
of public safety against the individual's interest in avoiding compulsory testimo-
nial self-incrimination-really misses the critical question to be decided. Miranda
has never been read to prohibit the police from asking questions to secure the
public safety. Rather, the critical question Miranda addresses is "who shall bear
the cost of securing the public safety when such questions are asked and an-
swered: the defendant or the State. Miranda . . .found the resolution of that
question implicit in the prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination and
placed the burden on the State.
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APPLICATION OF THE Quarles ANALYSIS TO In re John C.
The Appellate Division, Second Department, attempted to
factually distiguish In re John C. from Quarles, as a basis for de-
nying applicability of the public safety exception.50 The court rea-
soned that since the youth had been questioned for close to an
hour, during which time the apartment where the questioning had
taken place had been secured by upwards of fourteen police of-
ficers, there lacked the same type of volatile situation that existed
in Quarles.51
Although these facts are different from Quarles, it is submit-
ted that the cases are not truly distinguishable. It is difficult to see
how the passage of time makes a situation such as the one present
in In re John C. any less volatile. Moreover, it would appear that
the converse would be true, that is, the longer a danger is permit-
ted to persist the more likely it is that someone will be injured.
Similarly, the fact that the apartment had been secured by
upwards of fourteen police officers cannot be said to have made the
situation any less volatile than that which existed in Quarles,
where the suspect was handcuffed and surrounded by a number of
police officers in a virtually deserted supermarket in the middle of
the night.
Thus, it appears that under the Quarles analysis, the appellate
division should have found the public safety exception applicable.
Such a result, however, would be yet another step toward the com-
plete abandonment of Miranda.52 Theoretically, all missing weap-
ons could pose a danger to the public safety. In Quarles, the Su-
preme Court suggested that the police would be able to distinguish
almost instinctively between questions necessary to secure the
public safety and those designed solely to elicit incriminating re-
sponses.5" Such a standard, however, does not provide police of-
Quarles, 467 U.S. at 664 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
50 See In re John C., 130 App. Div. 2d 246, 253-54, 519 N.Y.S.2d 223, 228 (2d Dep't
1987).
" Id. at 254, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 228. The appellate division also noted that the interrogat-
ing officer did not appear to have questioned the youth out of any concern for public safety.
Id. However, that would be of little consequence since the Supreme Court in Quarles explic-
itly stated that the public safety exception "does not depend on the motivation of the indi-
vidual officers involved." New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984).
5 For a discussion of the trend towards abandonment of Miranda, see supra notes 25-
27 and accompanying text.
" See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658-59 (1984).
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ficers or the courts with any guidance in determining when a situa-
tion would be sufficiently volatile for the exception to become
operative.5 4
OPPORTUNITY TO PRESERVE Miranda THROUGH
THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION
State courts have the power, through the use of their state
constitutions, to provide greater protections for the rights of their
citizens than those guaranteed under the United States Constitu-
tion." In certain instances, the New York courts have interpreted
the New York State Constitution 56 as providing greater protection
than the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution.57
Since the Quarles analysis impermissibly impinges upon a criminal
suspect's right against self-incrimination, it is submitted that the
New York courts should, under the New York State Constitution,
completely reject the Quarles public safety exception, or alterna-
tively, specifically delineate the narrow circumstances under which
the danger to the public safety would be so great as to render the
' This proposition is exemplified by the opposite conclusions reached by the New York
courts and the United States Supreme Court in Quarles. See supra note 46 and accompany-
ing text. A single familiar standard is necessary to guide police officers who have limited
time and expertise to reflect and balance social and individual interests. Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979). Miranda supplies police with such a standard.
' See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975). "[A] State is free as a matter of its
own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those [the United States Su-
preme] Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards." Id. "The federal
Constitution establishes minimum guarantees of rights and the granting of additional liber-
ties does not violate its provisions." 1 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 1, §
1.6, at 31-32. See generally Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Consti-
tutional Rights, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1324 (1982) (analysis of current use of state constitutions).
1 See N.Y. CONsT. art. 1, § 6 ("No person shall be... compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself"). The language contained in the New York State Constitu-
tion's self-incrimination clause is identical to that found in the fifth amendment of the
United States Constitution. See US. CONsT. amend V.
57 See, e.g., People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 151, 193 N.E.2d 628, 629, 243 N.Y.S.2d
841, 842 (1963) (confession obtained after police refused to allow suspect to meet with his
lawyer held inadmissible). In Donovan, Judge Fuld, writing for the majority, stated, "we are
of the opinion that, quite apart from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
this State's constitutional and statutory provisions pertaining to the privilege against self
incrimination.., require the exclusion of [this] confession ... ." Id. at 151, 193 N.E.2d at
629, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 843 (citations omitted). See also People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 481,
348 N.E.2d 894, 896, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 420 (1976) (confession suppressed on ground that
once attorney enters proceedings defendant cannot waive right to counsel in absence of at-
torney). In Hobson, the court noted that the state constitutional basis for the the rule had
"extended constitutional protections of a defendant... beyond those afforded by the Fed-
eral Constitution." Id. at 483-84, 348 N.E.2d at 897, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
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exception applicable.5 8
CONCLUSION
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has limited
the scope of the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. 9
The Court has unwisely circumscribed the constitutional safe-
guards enunciated in Miranda by creating the Quarles public
safety exception. By so doing, the Court has increased the opportu-
nities for police officers to justify coercive interrogations with ques-
tionable claims of danger to the public safety, the very thing the
Miranda decision sought to remedy. Thus, the Supreme Court has
left it up to the individual states to determine to what extent their
citizens shall be guaranteed the right against self-incrimination."
" One possible alternative would be to adopt the approach taken by the California
courts in People v. Riddle, 83 Cal. App. 3d 563, 148 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 937 (1979). The Riddle court recognized an exception to Miranda where the following
requirements were met: (1) there existed an urgency of need in that no other course of
action promised relief; (2) there was a possibility of saving human life; and (3) rescue was
the primary motivation of the officer questioning the suspect. Id. at 576, 148 Cal. Rptr. at
177.
" See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. This trend has led to increased reli-
ance by state courts on state constitutional provisions. See Titone, State Constitutional
Interpretation: The Search for an Anchor in a Rough Sea, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 431, 436-37
(1987) (transition from Warren Court to Burger-Rehnquist Courts perhaps single most im-
portant factor behind heightened attention to state constitutions); Note, Miranda and the
State Constituition: State Courts Take a Stand, 39 VAND. L. REv. 1693, 1699-1700 (1986)
(Burger Court's rejection of Warren Court's broad reading of Bill of Rights has caused state
courts to rediscover their state constitutions).
" Justice Brennan has urged states to turn to their own constitutions. He has stated:
[S]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protec-
tions of the federal Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of individual
liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme
Court's interpretation of federal law. The legal revolution which has brought fed-
eral law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective
force of state law-for without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be
guaranteed.
Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV.
489, 491 (1977). Justice Brennan also noted that decisions of the Supreme Court interpret-
ing the federal Constitution should not be regarded as dispositive of issues concerning coun-
terpart provisions contained in state constitutions. Id. at 502. In such instances, Supreme
Court decisions should only be given weight when "they are found to be logically persuasive
and well-reasoned, paying due regard to precedent and the policies underlying specific con-
stitutional guarantees .... Id.
Justice Handler of the New Jersey Supreme Court, in a concurring opinion in State v.
Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982), listed seven reasons why a state court could utilize
its own constitution as an independent source of protecting individual rights: (1) textual
differences between the state constitution and the federal constitution; (2) legislative history
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It is suggested that the New York courts use the New York State
Constitution to avoid the undesirable shortcomings of the Quarles
analysis as illustrated in In re John C.
James G. Scotti
showing an intent to have the state constitutional provision interpreted independently of
the federal Constitution; (3) state law predating a Supreme Court decision; (4) differences in
the structure between the federal and state constitutions; (5) subject matter of particular
state or local interest not requiring a uniform national policy; (6) particular state history or
tradition; and (7) public attitudes in the state. Id. at 363-68, 450 A.2d at 965-67 (Handler,
J., concurring). See also Titone, supra note 59, at 465 (state's history and tradition may
provide basis for interpreting state constitution differently than federal constitution). New
York State has a history and tradition of providing greater protection to its citizens through
its own self-incrimination clause than the federal government does through the fifth amend-
ment. See, e.g., supra note 57. See also Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees and Protec-
tion of Defendants' Rights: The Case of New York, 1960-78, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 157, 192
(1979) (noting long tradition in New York State of affording broader protection under New
York State Constitution than that provided by federal Constitution); Kaye, Dual Constitu-
tionalism in Practice and Principle, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 399, 412 (1987) (same). For a
partial list of other states which have construed their state constitution's self-incrimination
clause more broadly than Supreme Court decisions interpreting the fifth amendment, see
Note, supra note 59, at 1717-18 n.181 (1986).
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